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TOWARD AN AUCTION MARKET FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE




Nineteen eighty-nine marks the twenty-first year since the passage of
the Williams Act, a federal statute designed to provide some regulation
of tender offers.1 While the Act has increased the amount of disclosure
made in connection with tender offers and provided some regulation of
the manner in which offers proceed, it said little about the legality of the
responses of target management to unsolicited, or hostile, tender offers.2
Rather, resolution of these problems was left largely to state law.
* © 1989 Mark J. Loewenstein. All Rights Reserved.
** Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. B.A. 1969; J.D. 1974, Univer-
sity of Illinois. The author wishes to thank Clifford Calhoun, Homer Clark, Ted Fiflis, Theresa
Gabaldon, Hiroshi Motomura, and Marc Steinberg for their helpful comments and suggestions on
an earlier draft of this article and Gwyneth Whalen for her excellent research help.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976). The Williams Act is the popular name of Pub.
L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), originally entitled: Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Owner-
ship and in Corporate Takeover Bids. The Act was passed in response to a growing number of
tender offers and Congressional concern that the offers were lacking in disclosure or were otherwise
unfair to target shareholders. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2812. The Act added a new section 13(d) to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, requiring certain disclosures by persons who acquire more than 10% (later
amended to 5%) of any registered equity security; a new section 14(d) requiring that certain disclo-
sures be made in connection with a tender offer; a new section 13(e) relating to issuer tender offers; a
new section 14(f) to require certain disclosures of specified changes in the board of directors of an
acquired company; and a new section 14(e), a broad antifraud rule applicable to all tender offers.
2. A regulation adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission under § 14(e), the
antifraud provision, requires the target company to disclose to its shareholders whether it recom-
mends acceptance or rejection of the tender offer, is remaining neutral with respect to the offer, or is
unable to take a position on the offer, in each case with its reasons. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1988).
Litigation has been brought under § 14(e) alleging that defensive maneuvers, such as lock-up
options, were manipulative and, therefore, violated the section. See, eg., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon
Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected such arguments in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985), holding that
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This dichotomy, in which federal law regulates the offer and state
law the substantive response by the target, has been responsible for the
development of an odd jurisprudence in the state courts. Early cases
gave a great deal of discretion to target management to defeat hostile
tender offers, in contrast to federal law, which at least permitted tender
offers. Applying the well-accepted "business judgment rule," the state
courts generally held that target management could undertake a broad
range of measures to ward off an unwanted suitor, so long as the target
board of directors was not acting "solely or primarily" to perpetuate its
control of the corporation.' Actions so motivated meant that the board
was acting in its own interest, not the shareholders', and, therefore, the
business judgment rule would not apply. Directors of target companies
seemed to have little trouble demonstrating that they were motivated, at
least in part, by concerns other than retaining their positions.' Thus,
they were able to prevail in actions brought by hostile bidders seeking to
enjoin the board's defensive actions5 and in suits by shareholders seeking
damages for the lost opportunity to tender into attractive offers.
6
The period of deference to target directors generated much thought-
ful criticism from academia 7 and eventually gave way to an era of judicial
"manipulation" requires a showing of misrepresentation or nondisclosure. See generally Loewen-
stein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule l0b-5 Comparisons, 71 GEo. L.J. 1311 (1983)
(arguing that Rule 10b-5 precedents should not set the bounds of a cause of action under Section
14(e)).
3. E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Good-
rich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
4. See Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defe.sive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 901, 926 (1979) ("Regardless of the tactic employed, management can easily manufacture a
'legitimate' corporate purpose for its action, even when it employed the tactic solely to perpetuate its
own status."). This position has been quoted in M. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
238 (1983). But see Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984) (board unable
to legitimate placement of stock in ESOP to defeat tender offer); Royal Indus. v. Monogram Indus.,
Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (defensive acqui-
sition preliminarily enjoined).
5. E.g., Treadway Cos., 638 F.2d at 357.
6. E.g., Panter, 646 F.2d at 271.
7. A few writers, drawing on traditional tools of economic analysis, argued that target man-
agement should remain passive when faced with a tender offer, thereby minimizing the "cost" of
takeover bids and maximizing shareholder wealth. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter
Proper Role]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982);
Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982). The
thesis of these authors is that the rules governing target responses to tender offers should operate to
maximize shareholder welfare. This occurs if target management takes a passive role when a tender
offer is made because even if it could take action to increase the price paid to its shareholders, the
shareholders as a whole would not benefit. It is important, the authors argue, not to discourage
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skepticism and restrictions on that discretion. The genesis of this latter
hostile tender offers because "the number of offers affects the efficiency with which corporations are
managed," and that benefits all shareholders. Proper Role, supra, at 1164. In this regard, the
authors were building on the influential work of Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corpo-
rate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965), who argued that a potential change of control polices
corporate managers. This view has received some judicial recognition. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 643 (1982) ("The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides incumbent management to
perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced [when a state official can block a tender
offer]."); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) ("[Through tender offers] the market for corporate control will be kept
fluid and corporate assets will be transferred, with a minimum of friction, to those who value them
the most, as measured by the prices they offer.").
A second position is that after one bid has been made, target management should act in a way
that encourages an auction for its shares. This approach, too, finds justification in economic analy-
sis. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028
(1982); Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1984); Gilson, 4 Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv.
819 (1981) [hereinafter Structural Approach]; Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity
in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REy. 51 (1982).
Coffee argues persuasively that the Easterbrook & Fischel approach overstates the efficacy of
the hostile tender offer as a means of corporate accountability and understates the other mechanisms
that exist, such as the monitoring function of independent boards of directors and shareholder litiga-
tion, for encouraging efficient management. Coffee also analyzes the diseconomies that result from a
high level of takeover activity, concluding that economic efficiency is best served by a policy that
encourages a competitive auction market for corporate control.
It is not the purpose of this Article to revisit the economic analysis so ably undertaken by the
scholars cited in this and the preceding footnotes. It is now well accepted that the tender offer plays
an important role in the market for corporate control and that allowing management unfettered
discretion to defeat hostile tender offers is both unwise as a matter of economic policy and increas-
ingly unacceptable as a matter of state corporate law. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v.
Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799 (1988) ("To acknowledge that directors may employ . . .'poison
pills' to deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose to accept a noncoercive offer, after
the board has had a reasonable opportunity to explore or create alternatives, or attempt to negotiate
on the shareholders' behalf, would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent with widely shared notions of
appropriate corporate governance as to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and authority of our
corporation law."). At the same time, the original thesis of Proper Role, that management should
remain passive in the face of a hostile tender offer, has gained no acceptance in the courts and
appears very doubtful as a matter of economic policy.
A third school of thought would give target management considerable leeway in deciding how
to respond to a hostile tender offer, based on various corporate law doctrines. The most prominent
proponent of this position is Martin Lipton, who has argued the case for management autonomy in
several articles. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979);
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom; An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017
(1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors Easterbrook &
Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1231 (1980). See also Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Take-
overs: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1983); Scherer, Takeovers: Present and
Future Dangers, BROOKINGS REV. (Winter-Spring 1986). Much of Lipton's argument proceeds
from the premise that tender offers do not play a role in policing inefficient management and that
target management is in a better position than shareholders to decide when and for how much the
target should be sold. He also argues that the takeover phenomenon causes corporate management
to focus on short term profitability and that the stock market does not efficiently or accurately reflect
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era was the Delaware Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.8 As a result of Unocal, the Delaware courts have
moved toward, although not embraced, an "auction model" for corpo-
rate control: once a bona fide offer is made for a corporation, its direc-
tors should react in a way that maximizes the return to shareholders,
generally through an auction for the corporation's shares. At the same
time, the Delaware courts have clung, at least nominally, to the business
judgment rule, as modified by Unocal, as the proper way to analyze
defensive maneuvers. Because of the influence of Delaware law in this
area, it is fair to say that the Unocal approach represents the trend for
many states.9
As a result of Unocal and its progeny, it is federal law, not state law,
that inhibits the auction model. This is true primarily because under the
Williams Act, a tender offer need remain open only for 20 business days
to comply with federal law, often too short a period of time for the target
corporation to generate additional offers for its shares or otherwise for-
mulate an alternative for its shareholders. Consequently, the Delaware
courts have had to countenance defensive maneuvers that have the
potential of discouraging all offers to assure the generation of the highest
offer.'" This, in turn, mistreats the first bidder, who must litigate the
target's defensive maneuvers against an uncertain case law.
This Article examines the transformation in the law of tender offers
and the continuing utility of the business judgment rule as a doctrine to
measure the appropriateness of defensive maneuvers. In brief, I conclude
that the business judgment rule has been battered by the storm of tender
offer litigation because it is ill-suited for the issues to which it has been
applied. The rule focuses too heavily on the relationship between direc-
tors and their shareholders and too lightly on the relationship between
the bidder and the target's shareholders. The bidder serves an important
role in the market for corporate control and in providing shareholders
the economic prospects of the traded companies. The problem with Lipton's work, as Coffee has
noted, is that it proceeds from largely impressionistic evidence and fails to articulate a coherent
theory "that explains why greater reliance on the market for corporate control could be problem-
atic." Coffee, supra, at 1154. See also Structural Approach, supra, at 848-65, for a careful analysis
and effective refutation of the arguments in Lipton's articles, and the Separate Statement of Frank H.
Easterbrook and Gregg A. Jarrell in Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, SEC, Report of Recom-
mendations, 70-120 (1983), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 1028 (CCH extra ed. July 15, 1983)
[hereinafter Advisory Committee Report] for a cogent statement of the economic justification for
limiting the discretion of target management.
8. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
9. See, eg., Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. 11. 1986)
[hereinafter Dynamics I1].
10. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
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with opportunities to realize a profit on their investment."l The consider-
able expense involved in making a tender offer, together with the impor-
tance of maintaining an incentive to potential bidders, requires that the
law recognize the interest of a tender offeror, as an offeror, and not just
as another shareholder of the target. 12
Such an approach would prohibit any action of target management
undertaken after a bid is made, or in anticipation of a bid, that materially
disadvantages the original bidder vis-i-vis other bidders, or has the effect
of precluding the bidder from proceeding with its offer. The bidder
would thus create a protectable economic expectancy as a result of a
good faith offer for the securities of a target corporation. As a necessary
corollary to this approach, the fiduciary duties of directors to their share-
holders would be altered; no longer would directors be required, or
indeed allowed, to "defend" against tender offers that they deemed to be
"inadequate" or "injurious" to the corporation by implementing defenses
that effectively preclude the shareholders from accepting the offer. To
the contrary, their fiduciary duties would obligate them to allow share-
holders to tender their shares to a bidder or, if the directors believe that a
higher bid can be obtained, to help facilitate such a bid. Finally, I recom-
mend that the Williams Act be amended to increase the minimum period
that a tender offer must remain open to 60 calendar days.1 3 The effect of
this change in federal law would be to enhance the auction process and
remove many of the justifications for defensive maneuvers. It would also
bring federal law into harmony with the evolving state law, as each
would encourage an auction market for corporate control.
11. See Proper Role, supra note 7, at 1173; Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d
250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) [hereinafter Dynamics II]. See generally supra
note 7 (cases supporting positions which maximize shareholder profit).
12. If a bidder claims unlawful interference by the target company's board with its offer, it
would not, under the standard proposed here, have to resort to derivative litigation against the
board. This would relieve the bidder of having to make a demand on the board and the other
limitations of derivative litigation. See Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984)
(noting that a tender offeror complaining of defensive maneuvers by the target company's board
could not maintain a direct cause of action).
13. Several recent legislative proposals call for an increase in the minimum period that a tender
offer must remain open. See Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987, S. 227, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133
CONG. REc. S465 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) (which would extend the minimum offering period for
tender offers for any and all of a company's outstanding shares to 30 calendar days, and for partial
offers to 40 calendar days); S. 678, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S2820 (daily ed. Mar. 6,
1987) (which would extend the minimum offering period for tender offers to 60 calendar days); and
S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. S1323 (daily ed. June 4, 1987) (which would extend
the offering period to 35 business days).
1989]
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Part II examines, briefly, the early cases challenging defensive
maneuvers and the establishment of the business judgment rule doctrine
that has dominated the analysis of such cases. Part III looks at the shift
in the case law that has taken place since 1985, when the Supreme Court
of Delaware decided Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.14 This section
concludes that the Delaware cases, particularly in the Chancery court,
are moving toward the auction model. Finally, Part IV suggests that the
courts continue in the direction that started with Unocal by abandoning
the business judgment rule entirely in cases challenging the propriety of
director misconduct in response to a hostile tender offer. An amendment
to the Williams Act extending the minimum time period during which an
offer must remain open would allow the courts to complete the transition
started by Unocal.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE
The traditional business judgment rule is based on two principles.
First, most state corporation statutes expressly entrust to the directors
the management of the business and affairs of the corporation.15 Second,
courts are, for various reasons, reluctant (or so they say) to second-guess
the business decisions of corporate directors.16 The directors' statutory
authority and the judiciary's professed timidity combine to allow corpo-
rate directors a degree of independence in which to exercise their busi-
ness judgment.
This independence gives rise to the following rule: Directors' busi-
ness judgments are immune from judicial review if the directors had no
conflict of interest with respect to the decision in question, acted in good
faith and on an informed basis, and rationally believed that their action
was in the best interest of the corporation.1 7 Delaware courts have cre-
ated a presumption that directors behave in this fashion. The burden is,
14. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
15. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.01(b) (1984) ("All corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation man-
aged under the direction of, [its] board of directors .... subject to any limitation set forth in the
articles of incorporation.").
16. Eg., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) ("Absent an abuse of discretion,
[the directors' business] judgment will be respected by the courts.").
17. Id. See also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del.
1974). The New York formulation of the business judgment rule is set forth in Auerbach v. Bennett,
47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) and is discussed in the context of a
takeover in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984). See generally Duty of
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therefore, on one challenging a corporate action to prove that the direc-
tors, in approving the action, fell short of the presumed standard. 8
If the directors lose the protection of the rule because they acted on
a matter in which they had an interest or otherwise acted without good
faith, 19 they must bear the burden of proving that their action was "fair
and reasonable to the corporation."20 If the directors were uninformed
when they acted, which, according to the leading Delaware case of Smith
v. Van Gorkom,2 ' means that they were at least grossly negligent in
deciding how much information they had and needed, they will bear per-
sonally the adverse consequences of the decisions so made.22 The direc-
tors have similar exposure if they did not rationally believe that the
action taken was in the best interests of the corporation. All of this
Care and the Business Judgment Rule in ALI, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALY-
SIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 4, Apr. 12, 1985) (the ALI's reformation of the
business judgment rule); R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-40 (1986) (a good overview of the busi-
ness judgment rule); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979)
(defining and explaining the rule).
In various statements of the rule, it is unclear whether if good faith and due care are present, the
decision of the directors might nonetheless be set aside. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litiga-
tion, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,194, at 91,710 n.13 (Del. Ch. 1989),
the court indicated that when the disinterested board acts in good faith and with due care, further
judicial review is unwarranted.
18. Typical is this statement from Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812: "[The business judgment rule] is
a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company .... Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. The
burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presumption."
19. If the complaint alleges that the directors had a conflict of interest with respect to the
challenged action, the presumptions favoring the directors arise only after they have initially estab-
lished that the decision was made in good faith after reasonable investigation. Solash v. Telex,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,608 (Del. Ch. 1988).
20. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980). The Delaware Supreme
Court has characterized this as the "entire fairness" test. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 94,401, at 92,595 (Del. 1989) ("In such a context,
the challenged transaction must withstand rigorous judicial scrutiny under the exacting standards of
entire fairness.").
21. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See also RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,713 (Del. Ch. 1989) ("In connection [with
the plaintiff's charge that the directors did not act with due care], their burden of course will be to
establish at a final hearing that.., the directors were grossly negligent."); In re Amsted Industries,
Inc. Litigation, Civ. Ac. No. 8224 (Del. Ch. 1988) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware file) (held,
record did not establish that defendant board was grossly negligent in its reliance on special
committee).
22. While Delaware law on director liability is probably representative of state law generally,
some variations exist from state to state. In Texas, for instance, directors would appear to have
greater immunity from liability. In the course of discussing the director's duty of care, the court in
Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir. 1984) observed, "Texas courts to this
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learning, and quite a bit more, has summarily been called the "business
judgment rule."
With these principles as a guide, the courts have considered chal-
lenges to the actions taken by target management in response to a hostile
tender offer or a threatened change in control. Panter v. Marshall Field
& Co.,23 a typical case, arose out of a 1977 exchange offer for Field com-
mon stock by Carter Hawley Hale (CHH). CHH initially offered one
share of its stock, valued at $36.00, for each share of Field's stock, a
premium of 64% over the pre-offer market price of Field stock. This
offer was later increased; CHH offered $42.00, in cash and CHH stock,
for each Field share tendered. Field responded with litigation and an
aggressive acquisition program that made it less attractive to CHH.
These tactics were effective; CHH withdrew its offer and Field's shares
dropped to a trading price of $19.00 in the market.
Disappointed by the lost opportunity to tender their shares, several
Field shareholders filed a class action in federal court seeking money
damages from Field and its directors. The complaint alleged violations
of the Williams Act and Rule 10b-5, breach of fiduciary duty, and inter-
ference with prospective advantage. The district court granted defend-
ants' motion for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' case, 2a and
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.2 5 The federal
claims were dismissed either because the necessary proof was lacking or
because the statute in question did not provide a remedy for the loss
alleged. The business judgment rule provided the necessary defense to
the claim of breach of fiduciary duty.
Of particular interest was the appellate court's attitude toward the
interest of CHH. The plaintiff-shareholders argued that the directors
were motivated by a desire to fend off all offers, regardless of merit. The
court said that actions so motivated would not breach the directors' fidu-
ciary duty, unless the motive was the directors' "sole or primary"
day will not impose liability upon a noninterested corporate director unless the challenged action is
ultra vires or is tainted by fraud."
The reaction of the corporate bar to the Delaware decision in Van Gorkom was strong and
resulted in an amendment to the Delaware corporate law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. viii, § 102(b)(6)
(1986). This provision allows a Delaware corporation to include within its articles of incorporation a
provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director for breach of the duty of due
care, provided the director acted in good faith and did not engage in intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of law. Other states have followed the Delaware lead. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 7-3-101 (Supp. 1988).
23. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
24. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Il1. 1980).
25. Panter, 646 F.2d at 271.
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motive.2 6 In other words, the directors could take defensive action
against a tender offer, presumably even a favorable offer, for the purpose
of defeating it, so long as some other motivation could be shown. In this
case, the board's response to the CHH offer included "defensive acquisi-
tions," which were also "motivated" by a desire to expand Field's busi-
ness into new markets. Thus, the actions were protected by the business
judgment rule. More importantly, the decision reflected a low regard for
protecting the interests of the bidder; the target board has a relatively
low burden of proof to legitimate its actions.
Disappointed bidders fared no better in the courts. In Northwest
Industries v. B. F Goodrich Co.,27 the tender offeror, Northwest Indus-
tries, sought to enjoin a deal by the target, Goodrich, that would have
made the tender offer uneconomical. The objectionable deal was with
Gulf Oil and provided for an exchange of Gulf's interest in a Gulf-Good-
rich joint venture for a large block of Goodrich stock. Gulf and Good-
rich had discussed a termination of their joint venture for some time, but
only came to terms when Northwest's tender offer surfaced. The effect of
the Gulf-Goodrich transaction was to increase the number of Goodrich
shares outstanding and place them in the hands of a shareholder friendly
to Goodrich and disinclined to tender them to Northwest. The injunc-
tion was denied because Northwest failed to show that the directors were
improperly motivated.
In both cases, the motivation of the directors is of little concern to
the bidder. What the bidder is objecting to is the nature of the action
undertaken by the target and the effect of that action on its interests. But
the analysis of the courts is limited to the propriety of the board action
vis-A-vis its own shareholders. So long as the board acts consistently
with its fiduciary duties, its actions will not be closely scrutinized by the
courts. Conversely, and this is the irony of the approach in Panter and
Northwest Industries, if the board breaches its fiduciary duty to its share-
holders, then a third party, the tender offeror, can complain of the
board's action. Even though the tender offeror in such situations is not
complaining of the breach of fiduciary duty, that breach gives rise to the
26. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981)
(articulating this test).
27. 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
1989]
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cause of action.28 This is well illustrated in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML
SCM Acquisition, Inc.,29 a Second Circuit decision.
In Hanson, the bidder (Hanson) sought to preliminarily enjoin the
exercise of a lock-up option granted by the target (SCM Corp.) to a rival
bidder, a group consisting of the management of SCM and Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated (Merrill group). The
option allowed the Merrill group to acquire SCM's "crown jewel"-its
pigments and consumer foods businesses-at a favorable price if another
party acquired more than one-third of SCM's outstanding shares. Han-
son acquired more than a third of SCM's shares in a "street sweep" fol-
lowing a terminated tender offer and then sued to enjoin the exercise of
the option.30
The Hanson trial court denied the relief, holding that the board's
actions were protected by the business judgment rule. The Second Cir-
cuit reversed in a split decision. While the appellate court did not disturb
the lower court's findings that the directors acted in good faith and with-
out fraud or self-dealing, it did not agree that the directors acted with
due care. After reviewing the evidentiary findings, the appellate court
concluded that the directors granted the lock-up option too hastily and
with too little information. Because the board breached its fiduciary duty
of due care, the burden shifted to the defendant directors to demonstrate
that the transaction in question was fair to the corporation. Hanson was
able to persuade the appellate court that there were serious questions
regarding the defendants' ability to meet this burden. Furthermore,
Hanson argued that the failure to grant preliminary relief would irrepa-
rably injure it and the SCM shareholders. Therefore, the appellate court
remanded the case to the trial court and ordered it to issue a preliminary
injunction.
28. In most cases the bidder owns some shares in the target company and, in theory, has
standing as a shareholder to allege a breach of fiduciary duty by the board in a derivative action.
Some courts have suggested that a bidder cannot, however, maintain a direct action as a shareholder.
Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 689 (E.D. Pa. 1985). But see Williams v. Geier,
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,283 (Del. Ch. 1987) (shareholder could
maintain a direct action to challenge a corporate restructuring that allegedly interfered with his
voting rights). Under the approach suggested in this article, disappointed bidders would have stand-
ing qua a third party to complain of director action that was harmful to it. See Loewenstein, Tender
Offer Litigation and State Law, 63 N.C.L. REV. 493 (1985) [hereinafter State Law].
29. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
30. A street sweep is the acquisition of securities during or immediately following a tender
offer, generally from arbitrageurs who have acquired substantial holdings of the security. See Acqui-
sitions of Substantial Amounts of Securities During and Following a Tender Offer, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-24976, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 84,160 (Oct. 1, 1987), a
rule proposed by the SEC that would regulate such transactions.
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It is odd that Hanson's relief turned on a finding that the board
acted without due care. Hanson was harmed because the grant of the
lock-up option had the effect of potentially depriving it of the assets that
it sought, leaving, in the court's words, a "denuded company."31 How-
ever, that would be true whether or not the board exercised due care in
granting the option. From Hanson's perspective, it was almost fortuitous
that the board acted hastily. This tension between the gravamen of Han-
son's complaint, the unfairness of the grant of a lock-up option to a rival
bidder, and the litigated claim that the board breached its fiduciary duty
of due care is apparent in the three published opinions in Hanson.
First, the opinion of the court, authored by Judge Pierce, has a
revealing discussion of appropriate relief. Arguably, money damages
would provide an adequate remedy for the shareholders if a portion of
the company's business were sold for inadequate consideration. That
was the relief granted in the Delaware case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,32
which Judge Pierce cited earlier in the opinion. However, Judge Pierce
dismisses this possibility in a single sentence borrowed from an earlier
Delaware case, Gimbel v. Signal Co., suggesting that a damage claim
against the directors is not a meaningful alternative. But damages might
have been a reasonable alternative in this case,34 because the directors
probably had considerable insurance and, more importantly, the deep
pocket of Merrill Lynch was available. Merrill Lynch and the other par-
ties affiliated with the Merrill group might have been considered aiders
and abetters to the breach of fiduciary duty and, if so, could have been
held accountable for their role.3" Because these issues were not explored
31. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 282.
32. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
33. 316 A.2d 599, 603 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
34. Cf. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd in part
and vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987) (The lower court denied the bidder's request for a
preliminary injunction of certain defensive maneuvers reasoning, in part, that because the bidder
intended to liquidate the target, its loss would be a monetary one and at trial it could recover "the
difference between the lost liquidation potential and the cost of its bid.").
35. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) ("[O]ne
who knowingly joins with a fiduciary, including corporate officials, in a breach of fiduciary obligation
is liable to the beneficiaries of the trust relationship."). See also Fry v. Trump, 681 F. Supp. 252 (D.
N.J. 1988) ("greenmailer" may be liable as aider and abettor of breach of fiduciary duty by directors
authorizing the repurchase of his shares); Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal.
Rptr. 177 (1985) (joint liability for directors who breached fiduciary duty); Deutsch v. Cogan, Civ.
Ac. No. 8808 (Del. Ch. 1989) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware file) (acquiror may be liable for
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty by the target's directors). Merrill's liability would
depend on a showing that it knew that the SCM board acted without adequate care, it was an active
participant in the process, and it benefitted from it.
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by the court, it is difficult to say whether money damages were an
alternative.
This relief would not, however, address Hanson's real concern: the
inability to acquire SCM on a fair basis. Judge Pierce implicitly recog-
nized this when he said that "market forces can best be permitted to
determine the outcome of this contest if the lock-up option is prelimina-
rily enjoined ' 36 because this is the sort of relief usually sought by a bid-
der, not a shareholder complaining of a breach of fiduciary duty.
The majority opinion also fails to characterize the directors' con-
duct-leaving it unclear whether the option was set aside because the
directors were negligent in granting it. The court is clear that the direc-
tors' conduct did not amount to gross negligence. However, if the direc-
tors were merely negligent, then the case is a significant precedent
because directors are generally not accountable in a derivative action for
their mere negligence if the conditions of the business judgment rule are
met.37 While there was evidence that the exercise price for the optioned
businesses was in some respects too low, the directors argued that they
relied on the expert opinion of a respected investment banker that the
price was "fair." Moreover, the option was intended to create an incen-
tive for the optionee to make a bid. Therefore, it was appropriate, as the
court conceded, that the price represent a bargain. Given these consider-
ations, the court should be reluctant to second-guess the directors, which
is why the district court found in favor of the defendants, why the con-
curring opinion emphasized that this was an "extremely close case," 38
and why Judge Kearse dissented from the result.
The explanation for the result is that the court needed to lind a basis
for setting aside the option, and it did so even though it meant deciding
that the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction was an abuse of
judicial discretion and that the lower court's findings of fact were clearly
36. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 283.
37. R. CLARK, supra note 17, at 126, notes that cases in which directors are held liable for
negligence are rare, leading him to doubt that courts "are serious when they say directors may be
held liable for negligence." See also Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Int'l, 741 F.2d 707, 721 (5th Cir.
1984) (The court noted that under Texas law a director will not be liable for a breach of the duty of
care unless the action is "ultra vires or is tainted with fraud."); Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS
Corp., 637 F. Supp. 406, 417 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Dyamics I]
("the standard for determining whether a board exercises informed business judgment is governed by
a standard of 'gross negligence'" [citing Moran v. Household Int'l., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985)]); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968) (the author reviewed cases over a period of several
decades and found only four in which directors were held liable); See also supra note 21.
38. Hanson, 781 F.2d at 285 (Oakes, J., concurring).
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erroneous. The court could have avoided those hard decisions by hold-
ing that the disappointed bidder may maintain an action in its own right
as a bidder 9 and that the business judgment rule provides no defense
under these circumstances because the board cannot unfairly interfere
with the offer." The court chose to reach that result by indirect means.
Hanson and other cases provide examples of the clumsiness of a
business judgment rule analysis when the bidder presents a sympathetic
case.4' Hanson's case was sympathetic because it was bidding for the
39. In the typical case, the bidder must maintain a derivative action as a shareholder of the
target. See Gearhart lndus , 741 F.2d at 707. The U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that a bidder
might maintain a tort action for interference, Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), but
there has been little reported litigation involving that tort in the context of tender offers. See gener-
ally State Law, supra note 28 (discussing traditional elements and recent treatment of tortious inter-
ference with economic advantage).
40. Some courts have suggested that the business judgment rule is not relevant when director
action is challenged in the context of a tender offer. A particularly forceful statement of this notion
can be found, in dictum, in Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 n.6
(S.D.N.Y 1985):
The right of a shareholder to sell his stock is a private transaction between a willing seller
and a willing purchaser and in no way implicates the business judgment rule. Therefore, a
board of director's assertion of a unilateral right, under the business judgment rule, to act
as a surrogate for the shareholder's independent right of alienation of his stock is trouble-
some. However, because of our holding we need not reach this issue.
To a similar effect is dictum by the court in Conoco, Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303
(S.D.N.Y. 1981):
What is sometimes lost sight of in these tender offer controversies is that the shareholders,
not the directors, have the right of franchise with respect to the shares owned by them,...
The Directors are free to continue by proper legal means to express to the shareholders
their objection and hostility to the.., proposal, but they are not free to deny them their
right to pass upon this offer or any other offer for the purchase of their shares.
This sentiment is further quoted in Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need for Reform, 23
WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 1, 10 (1988).
41. See also Plaza Sec. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 643 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd sub nom.
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551
A.2d 767 (Del. Ch. 1988) (The Board's decision to leave stock rights in effect was not reasonable, but
restructuring was a reasonable response that did not breach their duties.); Robert M. Bass Group,
Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Directors' failure to prove their restructuring in
response to a threat was reasonable entitled shareholders to preliminary relief barring restructur-
ing.). In Plaza Sec., which is typical of these cases, the bidder, Edelman, made an all cash offer for
the target, Fruehauf. Plaza See., 643 F. Supp. at 1537. The response included a management lever-
aged buy-out, structured as a two-tier, front-end loaded tender offer. The leveraged buy-out was
favored by a special committee of the target board composed of outside directors. Management's
offer was coercive, and the bidder sought to enjoin it. Id. at 1538, 1541. The court granted the
injunction, finding that the board violated its fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Id. at 1543, 1545-
46. But these findings were questionable, as the special committee arguably insulated the board from
charges that it had a conflict of interest. As to the claim that he committee failed to exercise due
care, it is noteworthy that the appellate court decision drew a dissent, which argued that under the
circumstances, the special committee did what it could. Id. at 887 (Guy, J., dissenting) ("The con-
straints of time alone, coupled with the lack of familiarity of the outside directors with the day-to-
day operations of Fruehauf, place practical limits on their function and responsibility.").
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company in good faith and its expectations were conclusively frustrated
by the target board. This sympathy was enhanced because the benefici-
ary of the board's action was a group, including target management, that
was proposing a leveraged buy-out of the company. Because instances of
the target board defeating a hostile bid were not infrequent, the Delaware
Supreme Court took a cautious step to limit the protections afforded by
the business judgment rule in two celebrated cases, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co.4" and Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.,a which are discussed in the-next section.
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Unocal and Revlon require the target board to treat the unwanted
bidder with a measure of fairness, though the decisions use other terms.
In Unocal, which was decided in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that director action in response to tender offers would be protected by the
business judgment rule only if the directors "had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed
because of another person's stock ownership" and the defensive action
taken was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."'  Revlon, decided
the following year, added a corollary: once the company is on the "auc-
tion block" (that is, events have made the sale of the target company
inevitable), the board's role becomes akin to that of an auctioneer, and
any action that they take should be consistent with maximizing the price
to the shareholders.
Taken together, these cases recognize that at least some duty is
owed to the bidder. The Unocal decision held that the directors can
react only when a threat is present and then only with reasonable
action,45 and Revlon limited the ability of the directors, at least in an
42. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
43. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
44. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
45. Two "threats" were identified in Unocal. The first was a two-tier offer by Mesa Petroleum
in which the front-end consisted of $54 cash per share for 64 million shares (which would increase
Mesa's ownership to 51% of Unocal) and the back-end consisted of a merger in which the remaining
shareholders would receive "junk bonds" with a value of $54 per share. Id. at 949-50. The second
threat was speculative-that Mesa would seek to "greenmail" Unocal into repurehasing its shares.
Id. at 956. Unocal's response to this threat was to offer to exchange senior debt securities with a par
value of $72 per share for the stock held by shareholders other than Mesa upon completion of the
first tier of Mesa's tender offer. The effect of Unocal's tactic, which was upheld by the Delaware
Supreme Court, was to cause Mesa to withdraw its offer, lest it end up as the sole shareholder in a
company with an enormous senior debt burden. Id. at 946.
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auction situation, to favor one bidder over another.46 The impact of
these principles depends on the courts assessment of both "threat" and
"reasonable action." Most courts can be characterized as deferential to
target management's assessment of whether a threat exists.47 Bidders
have fared somewhat better, however, when arguing that the response
was unreasonable in relation to the threat.4 8 These concepts are treated
separately below.
A. THE PRESENCE OF A THREAT
Unocal made it virtually inevitable that the courts would find a
threat present with the making of a tender offer, inasmuch as the burden
of demonstrating that a "threat" exists is satisfied, according to the opin-
ion, if the directors acted in good faith and made a reasonable investiga-
tion. 9 In other words, if these procedural requirements are satisfied, it is
not even necessary to examine the merits of the ultimate decision. Fur-
thermore, lest the burden on the board be too great, the Unocal court
provided a means to lessen it: "such proof [that a threat existed] is mate-
rially enhanced ... by the approval of a board comprised of a majority of
outside independent directors .... -
Most identified "threats" fall into two broad groups: (1) tactics by
the offeror that arguably threaten the voluntary choice of the target
shareholders and (2) offers that are arguably inadequate from an eco-
nomic perspective, but are not coercive. 51 In other cases, the target
board has argued that the bidder's post-acquisition plan to liquidate the
target, doubts about the bidder's ability to finance its offer, or fears that
the bidder or some third party may engage in a "street sweep" of the
46. The target board may favor one bidder over another if it is in the shareholders' interest to
do so. J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988) (topping fee of up
to $.40 per share and expense reimbursement provision of up to $1.00 per share were not a violation
of a target board's duties if the shareholders would benefit).
47. See infra note 87, discussing several recent Delaware cases in which the Unocal test was
applied. In each case the Delaware courts found that a threat was present.
48. See infra notes 85-110 and accompanying text.
49. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
50. Id. New York courts would seem not to apply a different standard for outside directors.
Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 n.12 (2d Cir. 1984) ("We are not persuaded
that a different test applies to 'independent' as opposed to 'inside' directors under the business judg-
ment rule.") (applying New York law).
51. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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target's stock52 are "threatening" under Unocal and, therefore, justify a
strong response. 3
There is, of course, no threat to the company in these circumstances.
These situations are quite unlike a threatened labor disturbance or con-
sumer boycott or a possible unfavorable legislative enactment, where the
board feels compelled to take some measures to avoid an adverse impact
on corporate earnings or assets. In such situations, there should be no
doubt that the board may take some action. The legality of a board's
"defensive" action, assuming it exercised due care in adopting it and did
not act in a way that benefitted the directors personally, would be mea-
sured by the same external standards that apply to any corporate action,
e.g., provisions of criminal law, tort law, statutory law, etc.
To the extent the identified threat endangers the shareholders, its
nature is in most instances similarly amorphous. One exception, how-
ever, is the so-called "two-tier, front-end" loaded partial offer. 4 Using
this tactic, the bidder offers a high cash price for a portion of the shares
(generally a majority) and discloses an intent to purchase the balance of
the stock at a lower price in a "squeeze-out" merger. This is a threat to
the shareholders because they feel pressure to tender into an offer that
might lack economic merit. The pressure arises because the shareholders
understand that if they fail to tender into the "front-end," they will be
left with the lower, "back-end" price for all their shares.
Fortunately, the truly coercive two-tier offer is all but extinct, prob-
ably because so many tender offers are challenged with competitive bids
that avoid the tactic. Even hostile offers often end with a negotiated
52. A "street sweep" is the rapid accumulation of target securities in the open market during
and/or shortly after a tender offer for those securities. The securities are generally purchased from
arbitrageurs. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1337 n.3 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1987); Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securities and Related Activities Undertaken
During and Following a Tender Offer for Those Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-24976
(1987).
53. The Unocal court gave some examples of takeover bids that might qualify as threatening:
"inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the
community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in
the exchange." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. (The Delaware court clarified its reference to other 'con-
stituencies' in Revlon, when it said that a target board may take into account such constituencies
"provided there are rationally, related benefits accruing to the stockholders." Revlon, 506 A.2d at
182. Further, such concerns are inappropriate once an auction has commenced. Id.) But the Court
did not explain in what respect these matters are threatening.
54. For a description of the two-tier bid and its economic effect on target shareholders and




transaction. 5 Moreover, the shareholders are not totally defenseless.
Some states have enacted "fair price" provisions in their statutes.
56
In states without such legislation, if the "squeeze-out" price is unfair,
state corporate law may provide an appraisal remedy for dissatisfied
shareholders.5 7 Additionally, protection is afforded under the fiduciary
duty rules applicable to the majority shareholders under those
circumstances. 8
Despite these factors, however, the coercive, two-tier bid remains a
problem, and it illuminates a frequently noted deficiency in the Williams
Act.59 Ideally, either the tactic should be banned or the minimum offer-
ing period should be expanded to allow competitive bids to emerge. By
providing a mechanism for the acquisition of a corporation by a tender
offer but setting forth a time limit that is theoretically too brief for com-
petitive offers to emerge, the Williams Act burdens target shareholders
and provides its directors with a rationale for a myriad of defensive
maneuvers.
The inadequate time limit in the Williams Act, combined with the
courts' disdain for the coercive two-tier offer, has another consequence.
When a partial offer is made that does not expressly include a second-tier
merger, target boards frequently assert that the bidder may impose a
squeeze-out merger at a later date at an unfair price. 60 Thus, the argu-
ment continues, "preclusive" defensive action-action that as a practical
matter withdraws from the shareholders the option to accept the offer-
55. City Capital Assocs., 551 A.2d at 790. Indeed, the current high prices offered in recent
tender offers have resulted in most deals being completed in negotiated transactions. See A.
FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 36 (1983) (Supp. 1987)
[hereinafter DEFENSES]; Promoter of Poison Pill Prescribes Stronger Remedy, Wall St. J., Dec. 1,
1988, at Cl, col. 4.
56. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-374a to -374c (West Supp. 1988) (requiring
approval of 80% of outstanding or 75% of disinterested stock); FLA. STAT. § 706.108 (West Supp.
1988) (requiring approval by 75% of disinterested shares); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232 to -234
(Supp. 1987) (requiring unanimous board approval and majority approval by disinterested share-
holders); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.725 (West Supp. 1988) (requiring approval by 80% of the out-
standing voting stock and 75% of the disinterested shareholders).
57. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 13.30 (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. VIII, § 262
(1986).
58. See Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("When directors of a Dela-
ware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost
good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.").
59. See Advisory Committee Report, supra note 7, at 77. See also Lowenstein, supra note 7
(focus on the Bendix-Martin-Marietta case); Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 4 (posing solutions for
unclear management standards); Steinberg, supra note 40 (SEC should have primary jurisdiction).
60. E.g., Dynamics III, 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
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is justified. The problem with allowing target boards this freedom of
action is that it provides a rationale for defeating all partial offers.6 t
However, the Williams Act specifically contemplates partial offers,62 and
the law ought not to permit target boards to frustrate this policy. In
sum, the two-tier threat would best be handled by an outright ban or, as
is argued here, by an extension of the mandatory offering period and
other policies that encourage an auction market, rather than by allowing
target management to defeat all two-tier and partial offers.
The claim that the offered price is inadequate and defensive maneu-
vers are therefore justified makes the case for target management less
63persuasive. First, this claim is too easy for the target board to make
and, for that reason, ought not to justify preclusive action. The bidder,
after all, is invariably offering a substantial premium over the market
price, while target management, on the other hand, is often pointing to
the "hoped-for" effects of its plans and economic trends. If target man-
agement proves wrong, shareholders lose a valuable opportunity.
6 4
Second, the threat to shareholders-that they will not realize as
much on their share holdings as they might if they did not tender and
held their stock for some indeterminate period of time-is not a threat
that, in other circumstances, the directors are obliged to counter. The
Delaware court has created a new duty for the directors that it may well
reexamine. Under current law, for instance, the board has no duty to
monitor the market for the company's stock and take action to detect
and thwart the manipulation of its share prices.65
61. Were a truly coercive, two-tier front-end loaded tender offer to be made, the target board
would not be defenseless. The possibilities of other bidders, a management-led leveraged buy-out,
direct negotiation with the bidder, or a noncoercive self-tender are all available tactics that respect
the interests of the bidder.
62. Section 14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act sets forth a rule requiring pro rata acceptance of
oversubscribed partial offers. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d)(6) (1988).
63. Delaware law seems to be evolving toward this conclusion. In Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v.
Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 289 (Del. Ch. 1989), the court observed the following: "It is difficult
to understand how, as a general matter, an inadequate all cash, all shares tendered offer with a back
end commitment at the same price in cash, can be considered a continuing threat under Unocal."
Nevertheless, the Vice Chancellor went on to hold that under the peculiar facts of this case, the
target board could interpose a reasonable defense based on an allegedly inadequate offer. See infra
note 82 and accompanying text.
64. See Jarrell, The Wealth Effects ofLitigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28
J. LAW & ECON. 151 (1985) (study concluding shareholders of targets that defeat tender offers
through litigation are unequivocally worse off); Jensen & Ruback, The Marketfor Corporate Controb
The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 29-40 (1983).
65. Assume, for instance, that there was a perception in the marketplace that the company's
stock was overpriced and that, as a result, a number of investors were short-selling the company's
stock. If the board believes that the short-sellers are driving the price too low, a duty to protect
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Third, the threat of the inadequate bid, like other threats that have
been identified by the courts, can be addressed by measures that respect
the rights of the bidder to continue its bid. Directors should be free to
seek other bidders. Recent history has shown that the ready availability
of capital for leveraged buy- outs (not to mention the availability of capi-
tal for conventional acquisitions) makes target management a potential
purchaser, no matter how large the purchase price. 66 Moreover, if a pre-
vious bid is truly inadequate, market forces operate to produce a compet-
itive bid, and these market forces would be enhanced if the minimum bid
period were lengthened.
When the identified "threat" is that the hostile bidder will, if suc-
cessful, "bust up" or liquidate the target, it does appear, at least at first
blush, that there is a threat to the company. On closer analysis, however,
it is clear that no danger is present and that preclusive defensive action is
unjustified. Assuming adequacy of price, it should make little difference
to the shareholders whether the bidder, the purchasers in liquidation, or
some combination of the two ultimately will be managing the assets of
the corporation.67
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the corporation
is, in essence, a business or a group of businesses. If these businesses are
profitable, or more generally if someone values these businesses as going
shareholders might suggest that they have to take some action to counteract the shorts. Of course,
this scenario can be distinguished from the two-tier tender offer because the shareholders are not
being "coerced" to sell. But seeing the price being driven down does put pressure on shareholders to
sell, particularly when they have reason to believe that the raid will be successful. At the present
time directors need not respond to the short raid, but if the Delaware decisions are construed as
creating a duty to protect share prices, they may be required to do so. Champion Parts, Inc. v.
Oppenheimer & Co., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,524 (7th Cir. 1989) (a
target company does not have a protectable interest in the market for its shares).
It is easy to lose sight of the fact that the statutory responsibility of directors is to manage the
"business and affairs" of the corporation. See supra note 15. In that respect, the dealings that
shareholders have with third parties in the purchase and sale of their shares is beyond the responsi-
bility of the board of directors. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1260 n.6
(S.D.N.Y 1985). See also Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,104, at 91,195 n.10 (Del. Ch. 1989).
66. It was reported that a management led team of RJR Nabisco Inc. bid in excess of $25
billion for the company. How Underdog KKR Won RJR Nabisco Without the Highest Bid, Wall St.
J., Dec. 2, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
67. It may make a difference to the creditors of the corporation, such as bondholders, who will
continue to hold corporate debt after the takeover. The creditors can structure their debt instru-
ments to protect themselves against corporate reorganizations that might adversely affect their posi-
tions. Regardless, directors do not owe a fiduciary duty to the creditors. Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc. v. Franz Mfg. Co., 531 A.2d 953 (Del. 1987); Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873 (Del.
Ch. 1986); 3 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 849 (Supp.
1988).
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concerns, then they will continue as such. Whether the businesses will be
owned by one group of shareholders or by several groups of shareholders
is of little consequence to the current owners or, with certain exceptions,
to society.68 Whether a combination or separation of businesses can
bring about greater economic efficiency is best determined by the market,
and to the extent that efficiency is enhanced, society will benefit. If the
most efficient operation of a company's business is through the existing
corporate structure, then the ever-present possibility of a management
buy-out provides that alternative.
When target management justifies its response to a takeover offer on
the basis of the bidder's post-acquisition plans, one must be skeptical. In
effect, the response is that the existing management can more effectively
manage the assets of the company than their as yet unnamed replace-
ments. Not only is this response potentially inaccurate, it is also irrele-
vant if the shareholders are being cashed out. In that case the future
management of the assets is of concern only to the present managers,
who have an obvious conflict-of-interest on that question, and to credi-
tors who have failed to place protective provisions in their debt
instruments.69
If the shareholders have no real concern, should the board? Put
another way, is there some value in continuing the corporation as a uni-
fied entity and, if so, is the beneficiary of that value one to whom the
board owes some duty?7" I believe that whatever value can be attributed
to continuing a corporation as a unified entity is insufficient to justify
68. The ownership of a corporation may be of concern when the business involves national
security or raises potential antitrust problems. In these and other instances, the provisions of posi-
tive law can be applied to achieve the desired results. Ownership is therefore not a concern of
corporate management. It is curious that courts have permitted target management to litigate anti-
trust issues, as though the target had a different interest than the purchaser. See Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986), cast doubt on
whether a target corporation ought to have standing under the antitrust laws to challenge its own
takeover. In Cargill, the Court held that a private plaintiff seeking to maintain an action to enjoin a
merger under section 16 of the Clayton Act must demonstrate an "antitrust injury"; probable loss
from increased competition that might result from the challenged merger was not such an injury.
Id. at 113-19. Arguably, a target does not suffer an antitrust injury and would thus lack standing to
challenge its own acquisition.
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. The recent popularity of management-led leveraged buy-outs makes this question a partic-
ularly interesting one. If the board has a duty to other constituencies, the leveraged buy-out may be
in jeopardy. The current state of the law is stacked against the nonmanagement bidder. If the offer
is favorable to shareholders, the target board pleads the case of the nonshareholder constituencies to
justify defeating the bid. If management is the bidder, then the maximization of shareholder values
is the predominant value.
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empowering the board of directors to defeat a tender offer. To the extent
that the kinds of corporate restructurings that might follow a takeover
are perceived as "evils," legislative solutions are preferable. Moreover, it
is not only successful tender offerors who restructure companies.
Restructurings are an integral part of the corporate culture and often
emerge as defenses to hostile tender offers. It seems irrational to permit a
corporation to restructure itself at any time, with the attendant disloca-
tions, while allowing directors to take action that would preclude a
potential purchaser of its stock from undertaking that same course of
action. If there is an evil to corporate restructurings, then all restructur-
ings ought to be regulated, not just those which might follow a tender
offer.
An allied justification for prohibiting post tender offer restructuring
is that the bidder, through the "bust-up," will make a quick and substan-
tial profit. There are three responses to this. First, the bidder is assum-
ing substantial risks in the transaction, and profitability cannot be a
foregone conclusion.71 Second, even if the prognosis proves correct, it is
unclear that the shareholders are harmed. The spread, or premium,
between the pre-acquisition price of the company's assets (as measured
by the stock market) and the liquidation price of those assets (as mea-
sured by the amounts paid by the ultimate purchasers of those assets)
will be shared by the bidder and the target shareholders. At the same
time, the company's assets will have moved to managers who place a
greater value on them than the stock market did and possibly a greater
value than target management did.7" The only "losers" are those who
71. Reports of troubled leveraged buy-outs are increasingly common. For instance, when Bea-
trice Co. was acquired by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. for $8.2 billion in a 1986 leveraged buy-
out, KKR estimated that it could realize a profit of $3.8 billion after Beatrice was liquidated.
Because KKR and its partners, which included top management of Beatrice, invested $417 million
in the acquisition, the estimated return was more than nine times their investment. More than two
years after the deal, however, key units of Beatrice remained unsold, and it was reported that the
"rosiest" estimate of investor profit at that time was about $382 million. Beatrice, Once Hailed as
the Deal of the Century, Proves Disappointing, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1988, at Al, col. 6. For another
example, see Campeau Retail Chains are Heavily in Debt, Facing Rising Troubles, Wall St. J., Dec.
14, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
72. This is a hypothesis of the efficient capital market theory and is the basis for the argument
that economic efficiency is enhanced when takeovers proceed unimpeded. See Dynamics II, 794 F.2d
250, 253 (7th Cir. 1986); Proper Role, supra note 7, at 1165-68. A study recently completed by the
SEC concluded that companies that make unwise acquisitions are themselves more likely to become
targets of takeovers than companies that make wise acquisitions (as measured, in each case, by
changes in the market price of the acquiror's stock following announcement of the acquisition).
When these companies were later taken over themselves, part of the shareholders' gain in those
transactions "reflects recovery of target equity value that had been lost because of the targets' 'poor'
acquisition strategies. This evidence is consistent with the argument that hostile 'bust up' takeovers
promote economic efficiency by reallocating the assets of target firms to higher uses, or by preventing
1989]
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lost the franchise of managing the assets, a franchise that the law pre-
sumably does not protect. Third, the liquidation strategy is one that is
available to incumbent management-if the target has experienced a low
return on the fair market value of its assets, it is free to liquidate some or
all of those assets and distribute the proceeds to its shareholders. In
other words, to the extent a profit can be realized, target management
can realize it for its shareholders and ought not complain when someone
else does. Indeed, many companies have followed this course in recent
years.73
Yet another justification posed by target management for defeating a
hostile tender offer, and one given credence by the courts, is that the
bidder is unable to finance its offer.74 It is unclear why this should neces-
sarily justify defeating the bid. If the offer cannot be financed, it will self-
destruct. With some exceptions, an offer without adequate financing can-
not "pose a threat" to the target company any more than a pistol without
bullets is a threat to fire. Where, however, the nature of the offer is such
that the shareholders or the target would suffer significant harm were the
offer to fail for inadequate financing, some response by target manage-
ment is certainly justified. Interestingly, in one case where inadequate
financing was alleged by target management, the bidder successfully
obtained its financing before the offer had expired, but the court still
declined to enjoin the target's defensive maneuvers.75
A final justification condoned by the courts for fending off a hostile
tender offer is that the offer, if successful, would result in a change of
control of the target company.76 Here, again, target management is mak-
ing the judgment as to who can best manage the company, a judgment it
target firms from making future unprofitable acquisitions." SEC Study Says Bad Bidders Make
Good Targets, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1315, at 4-5 (Dec. 7, 1988).
73. See, e.g., G.M. Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., Civ. Ac. No. 6155 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25,
1980) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware file).
74. Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir.
1987); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334
(Del. 1987). As a matter of federal law, the bidder is not required to have its financing in place
before commencing a tender offer. Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp. [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040 (Del. Ch. 1988); IU Int'l Corp. v. NX Acquisition Corp.,
840 F.2d 220, 222 (4th Cir.), 840 F.2d 229 (1988); Newmont Mining Corp. v. Pickens, 831 F.2d
1448 (9th Cir. 1987).
75. Buckhorn, Inc., 656 F. Supp. at 225.
76. A good example of this is set forth in Ivanhoe, which arose out of a tender offer for
Newmont by Ivanhoe. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1334. The Newmont board adopted certain defensive
maneuvers that precluded Ivanhoe's success and had the subsidiary effect of precluding a takeover
by Newmont's largest shareholder, Gold Fields. Id. at 1336. In a shareholder suit, joined by Ivan-
hoe, challenging the maneuvers, the court examined the appropriateness of the defenses with regard
to both Ivanhoe and Gold Fields. Ivanhoe posed a "threat," the court held, because its offer was
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can hardly make dispassionately. While there is precedent for allowing
corporate management to use corporate funds in a proxy contest, where
control might be at stake," such precedent does not justify use of the
corporate machinery to preclude the shareholders from accepting a
tender offer. At best, the board should be able to present its case to the
shareholders, as in a proxy contest; they have no right to coerce votes.
A board should not be able to exercise greater powers for another
reason. Corporations can be structured to give the board greater power
in takeover situations and to protect against some of the perceived evils
in takeover tactics. Since the Delaware Supreme Court decision in
Moran v. Household International, Inc.78 it is clear that, in the absence of
a bid, a corporation can adopt a "poison pill" that has the effect of
requiring potential bidders to negotiate with the board.79 While the
Household International poison pill was adopted by the board without
submission to the shareholders, the board obviously can submit such a
plan to the shareholders, thereby increasing the chances of judicial
deference.
inadequate and its financing was uncertain. Id. at 1342. As to Gold Fields, the Chancellor said this:
"Finally, the threat which Gold Fields posed was real. The Gold Fields board had in fact paused to
weigh its options. Throughout these maneuvers it had considered in earnest the possibility of either
independently purchasing control of Newmont or selling its interest to Ivanhoe." Id. In other
words, the possibility that Gold Fields might act in a way that resulted in a change of control of
Newmont justified defensive action by Newmont.
A different approach, with similar results, is evident in AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton
& Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986). In this case, the Chancellor examined the propriety of a
coercive self-tender adopted in response to an all cash noncoercive offer, at an apparently attractive
price. The threshold issue-whether there was a threat-was nonetheless resolved in favor of the
target. The Chancellor reasoned that the requirement that the target demonstrate the presence of a
threat is satisfied by showing that the defensive action had "a corporate purpose, not one personal to
the directors." Id. at 112. The self-tender had such a purpose, the Chancellor ruled, because it
offered the target shareholders the opportunity to receive a large, tax-advantaged cash distribution
together with a continued participation in a new highly-leveraged entity. Id. This view of the
"threat" test in effect guts it.
77. Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. Ch. 1957); Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955). See generally E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN,
PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1968).
78. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
79. After adopting a poison pill, the propriety of the board's decision of whether to redeem it
when an offer is made is subject to the same standards as a board decision to resist an offer. In
Moran, the Court said the following: "When the Household Board of Directors is faced with a
tender offer and a request to redeem the [poison pill], they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the
offer. They will be held to the same fiduciary standards any other board of directors would be held
to in deciding to adopt a defensive mechanism, the same standard they were held to in originally
approving the [poison pill]." Id. at 1354.
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In any event, these pre-offer devices are not the same as a poison pill
adopted in the face of a hostile offer.8° Such a maneuver changes the
rules of the game midstream, disappointing the expectations of the bidder
as well as the shareholders. Moreover, the shareholders can react to a
poison pill or similar tactic that shifts the decisionmaking authority from
the shareholders to the board by voting against incumbent management
or by proposing a resolution or charter amendment that would undo its
effects. However, neither of these options is available in the heat of a
takeover contest.
Corporate boards can also propose "fair price" amendments to
avoid the adverse effects of two-tier offers. Such devices, which can take
various forms, have the effect of assuring shareholders who do not tender
or whose shares are not purchased because of proration, that they will
receive a "fair" price, usually not less than the tender offer price, if there
is a second stage merger.8"
Finally, corporate boards can recommend reincorporation in states
with favorable anti-takeover legislation. While the regulatory schemes
vary from state to state, the effect of such legislation is often to enhance
the board's role in the takeover process and create some deterrence to
hostile tender offers. 2  The Indiana "control share" provisions,8 3 for
80. See H. Pitt, Remarks at a Meeting of the ALI/ABA Conference on Insider Trading and
Fiduciary Duty Under the Securities Laws, reported in 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 696
(May 5, 1989). Mr. Harvey Pitt, a prominent tender offer lawyer with Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver
& Jacobson, observed that it is more difficult to justify a poison pill proposed in response to a hostile
offer than one adopted as a planning measure. Id.
81. See DEFENSES, supra note 55, at 36-38; Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New
Dimensions in Defense Charter Provisions, 4 DEL. 3. CORP. L. 1 (1978).
82. State interest in regulating tender offers dates back to the 1970s, when the "first genera-
tion" of state tender offer statutes were enacted. The Illinois statute, which was typical of several
first generation statutes, was declared unconstitutional in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624
(1982). Seeking to avoid the infirmities of the Illinois statute, the states began adopting a "second
generation" of statutes shortly after the Court's decision in MITE. Over half of the states now have
statutes regulating tender offers, with many adopted following the Court's decision in CTS. See
Veasey, Finkelstein, & Shaughnessy, The Delaware Takeover Law: Some Issues, Strategies and Com-
parisons, 43 Bus. LAW. 865, 868 (1988). Many are control share statutes like the Indiana statute
upheld by the Court in CTS. See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1211 (West Supp. 1988); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 416-171 to -172 (Supp. 1987); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 12:135 to :140.2 (West Supp.
1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-90 to 55-98.1 (Supp.
1988); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9)(a) (West
1988).
A second type of state statute requires that takeovers be approved by a supermajority of the
target shareholders or meet certain "fair price" criteria. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-
374a to -374c (West 1989); FLA. STAT. § 706.108 (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-232
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instance, which were recently upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court,8 4 limit
the voting rights of a person who acquires a certain percentage of an
Indiana corporation to which the provisions apply; full voting rights are
available only upon approval of the disinterested shareholders. The law
does contain an exemption for mergers or share exchanges to which the
corporation is a party. Thus, when the Indiana provisions apply, a
potential purchaser runs the risk of acquiring shares it cannot vote, a risk
it can avoid by entering into an agreement with the corporation. Other
state laws have the similar effect of increasing the power of the board or
otherwise slowing down the acquisition."
In sum, the identification of a threat, a critical element in the Unocal
test, is largely in the hands of the target board of directors, and the Uno-
cal case provides too little guidance as to how the exercise of that discre-
tion is to be judged. 6 Of equal importance are the unconvincing
rationales for maintaining that discretion, which does not adequately
protect the interests of the bidder. The possibility of adopting ex-ante
structural changes to the corporation also exists as a means of eliminat-
ing many identified threats.
to -234 (Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd 1988); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1989).
Another type of state statute requires anyone who acquires a certain percentage of a corpora-
tion's stock to give written notice to the remaining shareholders, who then may require that person
to purchase their shares for "fair value." See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (West
Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
A final type of statute prohibits "business combinations" between one who acquires a certain
portion of a corporation's stock (generally around 20%) and that corporation for a specified period
after the acquisition (generally three or five years). See, e.g., 66 DEL. LAWS 204, § 203 (effective
Feb. 2, 1988), codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 203 (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912
(McKinney 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10A (West 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43 (Burns
Supp. 1988).
Obviously, these various approaches are not mutually exclusive, and several states have adopted
combinations of them.
83. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-43 (Burns Supp. 1988).
84. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
85. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
86. As Chancellor Allen noted in City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796
(1988), "Delaware courts have employed the Unocal precedent cautiously." In addition to City
Capital, only three cases have found defensive actions unreasonable in relation to the threats posed.
Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,104 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del.
Ch. 1986); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,924 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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B. THE REASONABLENESS OF THE RESPONSE
The post-Unocal cases in Delaware do not yield a clear picture of
how the reasonableness of the response will be determined. It is clear
from these cases, however, that the flexible Unocal test requires signifi-
cant judicial involvement whenever a defensive maneuver is used to
counter a hostile offer. The Chancery courts of Delaware have applied
the two-part test of Unocal in at least thirteen cases through mid-1989,
and the Delaware Supreme Court has issued a full opinion in one of those
cases. In every instance where a defensive maneuver was challenged and
the presence of a threat was an issue, the Chancery courts found the
presence of a "threat." This meant that the second test-judging the
reasonableness 6f the defensive maneuver-had to be examined by the
court. In brief, these cases suggest, in a very general way, that a defen-
sive maneuver is "reasonable" in relation to a threat if it promotes an
auction for the target and "unreasonable" if it does not lead to an auction
or gives such an appearance.87 Not all Chancery cases can be so
87. Cases that tend to support the proposition that the Chancery courts are moving toward an
auction market for corporate control include: MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., Civ.
Ac. No. 10428 (Del. Ch. 1988) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware file) (Plaintiff MAI's motion
for preliminary injunction requiring removal of anti-takeover maneuvers, including poison pill, was
denied. The court noted that such relief "at this early stage" would be inappropriate, but implied
that should the "stalemate" continue indefinitely, the target's stockholders "will be denied the
opportunity to make their own investment judgment."); Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury,
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,104 (Del. Ch. 1988) (The court enjoined
a proposed spin-off of a key target asset and ordered a redemption of the target's poison pill, reason-
ing that the only threat posed was an allegedly inadequate offer and the response was unreasonable
in relation to the threat posed. The offer had been pending for several weeks, no competitive bids
had emerged, and the offer was heavily subscribed. Finally, the plan of the target to enhance share-
holder value was not obviously superior.); City CapitalAssoc., 551 A.2d at 787 (The court ordered
redemption of a poison pill, but allowed restructuring to proceed so that the shareholders could have
a choice between City Capital's tender offer and Interco's restructuring. The poison pill was found
to be an unreasonable response to the threat, the possibility that the Interco shareholders might
accept the City Capital offer, which the Interco board alleged was inadequate.); Mills Acquisition
Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,071 (Del. Ch.),
rev'd on other grounds, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,072 (Del. 1988)
(poison pill enjoined to allow shareholders to consider alternative offer); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy,
Civ. Ac. No. 10,095 (Del. Ch. 1988) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware file) (motion to require
redemption of poison pill denied, as its presence may enhance the auction process); Nomad Acquisi-
tion Corp. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040 (Del. Ch. 1988) (refused
to order a redemption of a poison pill when the market price exceeded the tender offer price); Robert
M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (proposed restructuring was found to be unreasonable in relation to the alleged threat, an
inadequate price, and was therefore enjoined); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc., [1987-
1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,764 (Del. Ch. 1988) (a "serious offer" had not
yet been made because the market price exceeded the tender offer price and the poison pill serves to
promote an auction for the target); Facet Enterprises, Inc. v. The Prospect Group, Inc., Civ. Ac. No.
9746 (Del. Ch. 1988) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware file) (The court refused to enjoin a
1989] BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
characterized,"8 and this may not represent the view of the Delaware
Supreme Court.
poison pill because the bidding for the target was proceeding and an order of redemption was prema-
ture.); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986) (coercive
self-tender by target was held not reasonable in relation to the threat posed).
Cases that do not appear to support the proposition include: Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd sub.
nom. Literary Partners, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Civ. Ac. Nos. 10866, 10670 & 10935 (Del. 1989) (LEXIS,
State cases library, Delaware file) (Plaintiff Paramount made a cash tender offer for Time following
Time's announcement of a merger with Warner Communications. When Time and Warner restruc-
tured their deal to a cash tender offer by Time for Warner, Paramount sought an injunction. Held,
Time's restructured offer for Warner was a reasonable response to Paramount's hostile tender offer.);
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %
94,340 (1989 Del. Ch.) [hereinafter Polaroid II] (Plaintiff bidder challenged target's plan to repur-
chase a large number of its outstanding shares, financed in part through the placement of a block of
preferred stock in "friendly" hands. The court held that these measures were a reasonable response
to the threat posed by the bidder, namely, an inadequate price.); The Henley Group, Inc. v. Santa Fe
Southern Pacific Corp., Civ. Ac. No. 9569 (Del. Ch. 1988) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware
file) (The court refused to enjoin the issuance of debentures, which were part of a restructuring and
contained provisions that made a takeover more difficult. The threat was that Henley "might com-
mence a hostile tender offer" and that offer "might not be at a fair price and might jeopardize the
restructuring." Id. at 46. The restrictive debentures were reasonable in relation to this threat since
they were limited in duration and did not necessarily preclude a hostile tender offer.); Ivanhoe Part-
ners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987) (preclu-
sive defensive maneuver in response to a hostile two-tier, front-end loaded offer that the target board
found inadequate was held justified).
88. Arguably, Paramount, Polaroid II, Henley, and Ivanhoe, discussed supra note 87, are cases
in which the Chancery court condoned a defensive maneuver that had the effect of ending a bidder's
interest in the target without creating an auction. However, each presents a distinguishing charac-
teristic. In Paramount the Chancellor's opinion placed great emphasis on the fact that the Time-
Warner deal, whether structured as a share exchange (the deal reached before Paramount's tender
offer for Time) or a purchase by Time (the transaction following Paramount's offer), was part of
Time's well-developed business strategy and was not simply reactive to Paramount's offer. The
Chancellor's opinion thus distinguishes between structural defenses, such as corporate restructuring
in Robert M. Bass Group, and a plan that was part of a business plan. In Polaroid II, it was not clear
that the defensive maneuvers precluded a successful takeover, in Henley no bid was actually made
for the target and the restrictive provisions in the debentures only limited highly leveraged takeovers,
and Ivanhoe, discussed in the text, the nature of the offer-a coercive, two-tier offer-set it apart
from the rest of the cases.
Two other recent Delaware cases, not applying Unocal, are worth noting. In Shamrock Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,176, at
91,610 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Polaroid I], Vice Chancellor Berger refused to enjoin an
ESOP established by the target, Polaroid, following Shamrock's acquisition of 5% of Polaroid's
stock. The decision was on the merits, and thus the procedural obstacles that sometime preclude
preliminary injunctive relief were not present. Id. Moreover, the Vice Chancellor held that the
ESOP, despite its anti-takeover effects, was "fair." Id. at 91,623. The fairness issue was reached
because the Polaroid Board had not undertaken a Unocal analysis to determine if Shamrock posed a
threat to it or its shareholders. The Polaroid defendants argued that Unocal did not apply because
Shamrock had not made a tender offer or indicated that it would. Id. at 91,619. The Vice Chancel-
lor found that it was unnecessary to decide if Unocal applied because even if the defendants could
not avail themselves of the business judgment rule, the ESOP would pass muster under a fairness
analysis. Id. at 91,619-20. The opinion reflects a measure of deference to the Polaroid Board that
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In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 9 a major post-Uno-
cal case in which the Delaware Supreme Court issued a full opinion, the
court held that defensive action that precludes even an auction is "rea-
sonable" if it is in response to a potential two-tier, front-end loaded offer.
Although the Ivanhoe case is instructive and is discussed below, the
Chancery opinions are more numerous and may give a better indication
of the trend in the Delaware courts.
In ACAcquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co.,9  the first post-
Unocal case decided by the Chancery court, Chancellor Allen issued a
preliminary injunction against a self-tender proposed by the target,
Anderson, Clayton, because its terms were coercive. The self-tender for
65% of the outstanding stock at $60 per share ran simultaneously with
AC's offer for 100% of the stock at $56 per share. The AC offer was
conditioned on the abandonment of the self-tender and the receipt of at
least 51% of the outstanding Anderson, Clayton stock. The closing date
for the Anderson, Clayton self-tender, however, was before the closing
date of the AC tender offer. Consequently, Anderson, Clayton share-
holders felt compelled to accept the self-tender in order to avoid the risk
of losing the benefit of that offer and then seeing the AC offer fail because
its conditions were not satisfied.
Chancellor Allen opined that the Anderson, Clayton self-tender was
not reasonable in relation to the threat posed and, therefore, did "not
qualify for the protection of the business judgment rule."'" This may
have been because the board never clearly articulated the threat it faced.
He also found that the effect of the maneuver, "albeit a possibly unin-
tended one,"92 was to entrench the Anderson, Clayton directors, thus
surprised some observers. See Shamrock's Polaroid Bid is Dealt a Blow As Court Upholds Employee
Stock Plan, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1989, at A4, col. 2. Vice Chancellor Berger reconsidered Polaroid I
in Polaroid II and affirmed the result.
A second case worth considering is TW Services, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) S 94,334 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Allen, Chancellor). The court refused
the bidder's request for a mandatory injunction requiring the target board to lift a poison pill. The
all cash offer for all of the outstanding shares was heavily subscribed by the target shareholders and
financing commitments had been obtained by the bidder. The offer was, however, conditioned on,
among other things, approval by the target board and the execution of a merger agreement. Because
of those conditions, the court treated the offer as an offer to merge, and target board's response as a
decision not to accept the offer. In that context, the target board's response is judged by the business
judgment rule, and the more stringent requirements of Unocal are not relevant. The court further
found that the target board was fully informed and disinterested; its determination was therefore
protected.
89. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
90. 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).




constituting a breach of the duty of loyalty. Therefore, the directors had
the burden of demonstrating the intrinsic fairness of the maneuver, a bur-
den that, according to the Chancellor, they did not meet. The opinion
thus prevents maneuvers that preclude the tender offeror from competing
with the target and marks the first indication that the Chancery courts
might be moving toward an auction model.
Several subsequent cases decided by the Chancery courts confirm
this view of Anderson, Clayton & Co. In Grand Metropolitan PLC v.
Pillsbury,9" a late 1988 decision, retired Justice Duffy, who was sitting by
designation, ordered the target, Pillsbury, to redeem its poison pill or
otherwise exempt its effects from the pending offer of Grand Metropoli-
tan. The court also restrained Pillsbury from proceeding with a pro-
posed restructuring. Grand Metropolitan's offer had been pending for
nearly three months when the opinion came down and during that period
no other offers had emerged other than the restructuring plan proposed
by Pillsbury. The tender offer, an all-cash offer for all of Pillsbury's out-
standing stock, was heavily subscribed. The "threat" posed by the
offer-it was allegedly inadequate-did not justify the preclusive defen-
sive maneuvers taken by the directors. For these reasons, Justice Duffy
concluded that the Pillsbury board was acting unreasonably in proposing
the restructuring, leaving the poison pill in place, and otherwise preclud-
ing its shareholders from accepting the Grand Metropolitan offer. The
poison pill had outlived its purpose.94
Two other recent Chancery court opinions disapproved of preclu-
sive defensive maneuvers adopted in response to noncoercive offers that
were alleged by the target's board to be inadequate. In City Capital Asso-
ciates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc." the court ordered the target to
redeem a poison pill, and in Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans96 a
preclusive restructuring was enjoined. In each case, the court held that
the target acted unreasonably in not permitting the shareholders to
choose the proposed offer.
In the aggregate, these cases suggest that the shareholders ought to
be able to consider noncoercive offers, at least at some point. They also
provide an interesting contrast to pre-Unocal cases, such as Marshall
Field v. Panter, discussed above, and some post-Unocal cases from other
93. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 5 94,104 (Del. Ch. 1989).
94. Accord Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Resources, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.
Texas 1988) (applying Delaware law).
95. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
96. 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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jurisdictions that defer to the directors' judgment that the target ought to
remain independent.97 Under the Chancery courts' cases, it is no longer
sufficient to demonstrate that the directors had motives other than main-
taining their positions. If the defensive maneuver has an entrenchment
"effect," which surely could be said of the defensive acquisitions in Mar-
shall Field, the protections of the business judgment rule may be unavail-
able. This approach suggests greater protection for the bidder.
Anderson, Clayton, Pillsbury, City Capital, and Robert M. Bass are
easy to square with the auction model; the court enjoined a defensive
maneuver in each case. In addition, there are several decisions of the
Chancery court denying relief to bidders that also might be read as sup-
porting the auction model. In Doskocil Cos. Inc. v. Griggy,98 for instance,
the court noted that the poison pill might have the effect of enhancing the
auction process. In both Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp. 99 and
Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Continental, Inc. 00 the court noted that the
market price of the target securities exceeded the tender offer price, sug-
gesting that the market anticipated additional bidding for the target and
suggesting that the poison pill was not, at that stage in the process, inhib-
iting an auction for the target. Similarly, the Chancery court refused to
order redemption of the poison pill in Facet Enterprises, Inc. v. The Pros-
pect Group, Inc., 10 noting that bidding was proceeding and that with the
poison pill in place a higher bid might emerge.
Another recent pronouncement of the Chancery court in this area,
MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., °2 confirms these observa-
tions. The fact pattern is typical of the cases noted in the preceding para-
graph: A hostile tender offer is followed by the adoption of anti-takeover
measures, including a poison pill, and then litigation by the bidder chal-
lenging the measures. The Vice Chancellor refused to issue the requested
mandatory preliminary injunction, finding that the anti-takeover meas-
ures were reasonable because the tender offer price represented only a
small premium over the market price and relatively few shareholders had
tendered into the offer. The court noted, however, that in the litigation
97. See, e.g., Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp., 686 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. II. 1988) (Apply-
ing Delaware law, the court upheld a poison pill, deferring to the directors' decision to assure contin-
ued independence for the company.).
98. Civ. Ac. No. 10,095 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware file).
99. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,040 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988).
100. [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,764 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988).
101. Civ. Ac. No. 9746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 1988) (LEXIS, State cases library, Delaware file).




before it the takeover was at an "early stage,"' 10 3 implying that it thought
further bidding or other events would arise giving it another opportunity
to rule on the defensive maneuvers. This inference is supported by this
seemingly gratuitous statement near the end of the opinion:
[I]f the present stalemate continues indefinitely the stockholders of
Prime will be denied an opportunity to make their own investment
judgment whether they should accept a tender offer because the anti-
takeover mechanisms are so burdensome that no prospective tender
offeror could afford to buy the shares so long as they are in place. 14
The court is stating the obvious, probably to send a message to the target
that the "stalemate" ought not to continue indefinitely. Pillsbury,
decided just days before MAI Basic, makes it clear that such a stalemate
cannot continue indefinitely.
These cases from the Chancery court, favoring the auction model,
should be considered in light of the fact that the Delaware Supreme
Court has never held that a defensive maneuver was unreasonable in rela-
tion to the threat posed. It is unclear whether the Delaware Supreme
Court would agree with the trend that appears to be emerging in the
Chancery opinions. As noted above, the Delaware Supreme Court has
issued only one opinion directly applying Unocal. In Ivanhoe, the court
atfirmed a lower court decision denying a preliminary injunction sought
by the bidder, Ivanhoe, against a large cash dividend issued by the target,
Newmont, that helped finance a "street sweep" by Newmont's largest
shareholder."°5 The effect of this maneuver was to allow this shareholder
to acquire almost one-half of Newmont's stock, thus practically blocking
the tender offer.
The Newmont board claimed that the "threat" posed by Ivanhoe's
tender offer was two-fold: it was both "inadequate" and "coercive"
because it was not adequately financed and might be followed by a lower,
noncash merger. The court accepted this reasoning despite Ivanhoe's
assurance that it was fully financed and would provide the same consid-
eration in a cash merger for the remaining shares following the tender
offer. More importantly, the court held that these threats justified a
maneuver that precluded the success of Ivanhoe's offer. No auction was
possible if nearly one-half of the shares were held by a single shareholder.
There are several possible readings of the court's opinion in Ivanhoe.
A cynical reading would note the presence of T. Boone Pickens as the
103. Id. at 91,635.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 28.
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key player in Ivanhoe Partners. Mr. Pickens is a notorious "green-
mailer," 10 6 as the court noted in its opinion, 0 7 and thus unlikely to evoke
much sympathy from the Delaware courts. Indeed, he was the principal
in the group that bid for Unocal, where the Delaware Supreme Court
approved a preclusive defensive maneuver-a self-tender by Unocal that,
by its terms, precluded the Pickens group from accepting the offer. 108
A second reading of Ivanhoe would focus on the potentially coercive
aspects of the tender offer. The Delaware Supreme Court characterized
the Ivanhoe offer as a coercive, two-tier offer, although, in reality, it was
less than classic. Ivanhoe did not threaten to squeeze-out the nontender-
ing shareholders in a merger with a lower price than the tender offer. In
fact, it promised a merger at the same price and in cash. Perhaps the
court chose to characterize the Ivanhoe offer as coercive because this
would justify the harshest defensive maneuvers. Thus, the case may sim-
ply stand for the proposition that preclusive defensive maneuvers are jus-
tified, or "proportional to the threat posed,"' 1 9 when the hostile tender
offer is a coercive, two-tier offer at a price that the target board believes is
inadequate. This view is echoed in Justice Duffy's opinion in Pillsbury:
"In the principal, [if] not in all, Delaware cases validating the Pill, it is
apparent that the purpose thereof was to create a 'defense' against hos-
tile, coercive acquisition techniques."" 0
A third possible reading of Ivanhoe would focus on the discretion
that the court allowed the target directors. Once they have made a judg-
ment, in good faith and after reasonable investigation, that the offer is
not in the best interests of the target shareholders, their actions will be
clothed with a presumption of propriety. This reading finds support in
the language of the opinion. It ends with a now-familiar recitation of the
business judgment rule and sounds very much like pre-Unocal cases:
The ... defensive scheme.., accomplished the two essential objectives
of thwarting the inadequate coercive Ivanhoe offer, and of insuring the
106. The term "greenmailer" refers to a corporate raider who acquires a stake in a target and
threatens a hostile takeover as a means of coercing the target to repurchase its holdings at a profit to
the raider. See Heckman v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 123 n.l, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 180 n.l
(1985).
107. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1342 (Del. 1987).
108. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
109. See Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to the Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247 (1989); Grand Metropolitan PLC v.
Pillsbury, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,104, at 91,193 (Del. Ch. 1988)
("This balancing or proportionality element refers to the effect of the takeover bid 'on the corporate
enterprise' ... ").
110. Grand Metropolitan, at 91,195.
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continued interest of the public shareholders in the independent con-
trol and prosperity of Newmont. Under the circumstances, the board's
actions taken by a majority of independent directors, are entitled to the
protection of the business judgment rule."'
In any event, the Delaware Supreme Court seems more tolerant of
target management and less solicitous of bidders than does the Chancery
court. Whether the former will be less tolerant of preclusive defensive
manuevers in other instances awaits a case in which the offer is not coer-
cive and the offeror is not Mr. Pickens. The Delaware Supreme Court
might also be influenced by changes in the Williams Act limiting some
bidder tactics, if any are enacted.1 12 It might also be influenced by deci-
sions, such as those discussed in the next section, that recognize the
interests of the bidder more directly.
IV. REPLACING THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: A NEW
LOOK AT OLD LEARNING
Eighteen years ago, in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries,"3 the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that a corporation could not, at the eleventh
hour, change the date of the annual shareholders' meeting to thwart the
efforts of the plaintiff, a dissident group that was planning a proxy con-
test. The opinion was clear and concise. Because the directors acted for
the purpose of perpetuating themselves in office, a purpose counter to
"established principles of corporate democracy," the action could "not
be permitted to stand."' 4
In Schnell, the Delaware Supreme Court did not discuss whether
the directors breached a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs, nor did the busi-
ness judgment rule merit even a passing reference by the court. The
opinion was grounded on good, old-fashioned equitable principles.
Responding to the defendant's argument that it complied strictly with
the provisions of Delaware corporate law, the court said that "inequita-
ble action does not become permissible simply because it is legally
possible."'1 5
11. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345.
112. See supra note 13.
113. 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971).
114. Id. at 439. See also Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906 (Del. Ch. 1980) (apply-
ing Schnell test in the context of a by-law amendment).
115. Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439.
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Though often cited in cases that do not involve tender offers, 16 the
forthright approach of Schnell has not had a significant impact in shap-
ing the outcome of recent cases that seem to call for its application. The
modem equivalent of the fact pattern in Schnell is the adoption by direc-
tors of defensive maneuvers in response to a hostile takeover attempt that
render the offer impractical. 117 The legality of those defensive maneuvers
could be tested under a Schnell formula: Have the directors acted inequi-
tably with regard to the bidder? Instead, as noted above, the courts have
opted for a complicated application of the business judgment rule. t t8
Despite the predominance of the business judgment rule analysis,
some recent cases can be read as sympathetic to the Schnell approach.
The Chancery opinions noted above might be read in such a manner.
More significant, however, are a pair of 1986 opinions by the Seventh
Circuit arising from the struggle for control of CTS Corporation.1 9 The
first of these involved a shareholders' rights plan adopted by CTS to
defeat a tender offer by Dynamics Corporation to increase its holdings in
CTS from 9.6% to 27.5%. Under the CTS plan, when any shareholder
acquired 15% or more of CTS's outstanding stock, all other shareholders
would be entitled to purchase from CTS a securities package consisting
of CTS stock and debentures for 25% of the current market price of the
package. If the tender offer were successful and the plan were allowed to
stand, the effect of the plan would be to reduce Dynamics' percentage
ownership in CTS from 27.5% to 20.7% and inflict a substantial capital
116. A typical, recent example is Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 93,965 (Del. Ch. 1988). In Blasius, the defendant board was
faced with a shareholder consent statement that added eight directors to the board, giving the insur-
gent group a majority on the board. In response, the directors appointed two of their own nominees.
If that action were permitted to stand, the insurgents would lose their majority. The Chancery court
held the board's election must be set aside when board action affects the allocation of power between
itself and the shareholders. In such a situation, the business judgment rule is inapplicable and the
board bears "the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action." Id. at
90,485. The defendant board was unable to meet that burden in this case.
117. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986) is a
good example. In response to AC's tender offer at $56 cash per share for 100% of Anderson shares,
Anderson countered with a self-tender for 65% of its stock at $60 per share. Id. at 104. The expira-
tion date for the self-tender preceded that of the AC offer, and the AC offer was conditioned upon (a)
Anderson's abandonment of its offer and (b) AC'S receiving at least 51% of the outstanding stock.
Id. Thus Anderson shareholders were "coerced" into tendering into the self-tender, because they
could not take the chance that the self-tender would fail and AC would take up their shares. For
this reason, the Chancellor held that the self-tender was not a reasonable response to the AC offer.
Id. at 114. Before reaching such a result, the Chancellor was obligated, under Delaware precedent,
to plod through the business judgment rule and Unocal tests.
118. See supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
119. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter
Dynamics IV]; Dynamics II, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
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loss on it."' ° In short, Dynamics could not proceed unless the plan were
set aside.
The district court did just that."'1 Applying Indiana law, which the
court said meant looking to Delaware decisions, the court entered a pre-
liminary injunction, holding that Dynamics might be able to show that
the CTS board was motivated by a desire to entrench itself in office and
that the action taken by the board was not reasonable in relation to the
threat posed by Dynamics. The Seventh Circuit affirmed with an opin-
ion, by Judge Posner, that was refreshing in its approach. 122
Like the district court, the appellate court cited all of the key Dela-
ware precedents in the area, but the appellate court opinion broke form
from past decisions and applied a novel analysis. Rather than starting
out with a recitation of the business judgment rule and its various pre-
sumptions, Judge Posner first reviewed the standards for granting a pre-
liminary injunction and then discussed the economic effect of defensive
maneuvers, such as the shareholder rights plan or poison pill adopted by
CTS in this case. The opinion notes the importance of the hostile tender
offer as a device for maintaining a market for corporate control and the
possible deleterious effects of the presence of a poison pill. The opinion
also reviewed the economic literature on the effect on shareholder wealth
of defeating a tender offer by defensive maneuvers. This portion of the
opinion concluded with a note of skepticism: "[The arguments for defen-
sive maneuvers] strike us as giving too little weight to the effect of 'defen-
sive' measures in rendering shareholders defenseless against their own
managements." 
12 3
With this information, rather than abstract principles of corporate
law, as background, the opinion considers the legality of the CTS poison
pill, first examining the process by which it was adopted and then moving
on to the effect on CTS if the pill is triggered. As to the former, while the
opinion concludes that the Dynamics' tender offer "was not evaluated in
a cool, dispassionate, and thorough fashion,"12" this shortcoming was
apparently not the basis for upholding the lower court's decision.
Rather, the appellate court's decision seems to turn on the unfairness of
the pill, the adverse effect on Dynamics if the CTS shareholders exercised
their rights under the pill, and the lack of compelling reason behind the
120. Dynamics II, 794 F.2d at 258.
121. Dynamics I, 637 F. Supp. 406 (N.D. Ill 1986).
122. Dynamics II, 794 F.2d at 250.
123. Id. at 255.
124. Id. at 257.
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pill. Without citing any doctrine or case authority, the court concluded
this portion of the opinion by saying, quite simply, that "the poison pill
was properly enjoined." '125
One is left with the strong impression that the outcome in this case
turns more on the effect of the action taken by the CTS board than on the
process by which its decision was reached. Of equal importance is the
presence of a discussion of how the defensive action affects the financial
investment and expectations of the bidder, Dynamics. By comparison,
most earlier decisions tended to focus on the good faith and due care of
the target board. The first CTS case is, thus, a good example of an
approach that does not get bogged down in a business judgment rule
analysis that ignores the bidder's interest.
Soon after the district court's decision setting aside its poison pill,
the CTS board adopted a new plan-a plan that formed the basis of a
second round of decisions in the district court and Seventh Circuit.
Here, however, the two courts reached different conclusions: the lower
court held that the new plan was legal, 126 while the appellate court
disagreed.
127
Under the new plan, each CTS shareholder had the right to
exchange his or her CTS shares for one-year notes with a principal
amount of $50 and bearing interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The
rights became exercisable if any person acquired ownership of 28% or
more of the outstanding CTS stock, and the 28% holder was excluded
from the rights offering. Dynamics' tender offer for 18% of the out-
standing CTS shares at $43 per share was pending at the time the plan
was implemented. Because the plan had the effect of prohibiting Dynam-
ics from increasing its ownership above 28% unless it was prepared to
pay at least $50 per share, it sued to enjoin the plan. Dynamics also
argued that the plan had an adverse effect on its ability to wage a proxy
contest for the control of CTS.
The CTS directors were more careful this time around. Before
adopting the new plan, they formed a special committee of outside direc-
tors and retained an independent legal counsel to advise that committee
on how to deal with the Dynamics offer. These steps increased the
board's credibility and influenced the district court's view of the matter.
The defendant directors convinced the district court that they acted in
125. Id. at 259.
126. Dynamics Ill, 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N.D. Il1. 1986).
127. Dynamics IV, 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
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good faith following a reasonable investigation.' 28 The court was also
persuaded that the new plan was a reasonable response to the "threat"
identified by the CTS board-the possibility that Dynamics would gain
control of CTS and implement a second-step merger at an unfair price.129
, The appellate court reversed in another opinion by Judge Posner.
1 30
As in the first go-around, the appellate court's opinion stands in contrast
to the lower court's opinion. While the district court was willing to defer
to the judgment of the "independent committee," the Court of Appeals
was skeptical. Posner's opinion examined closely the purported ratio-
nales for the second, pill and concluded that the record was inadequate to
support those rationales. 131 He doubted that either the triggering event,
ownership of 28% by one person or group, or the conversion price, $50
per share, was justifiable. In short, the appellate court would not
approve the pill unless it was clear that the pill was consistent with the
goal of maximizing shareholder values and maintaining a market for cor-
porate control.'
32
The Court of Appeals decision, while not expressly embracing the
auction model, is consistent with it. By comparison, the Second Circuit
decision in Hanson and the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Ivan-
hoe, both discussed above, do not expressly examine the board's defen-
sive action with a view toward the effect on shareholder values or the
bidder's interests. The focus in these cases is on the board's deliberative
process, on whether the business judgment rule would insulate the
board's decisions from judicial scrutiny. While the Hanson opinion notes
that the price of the optioned assets was likely too low, it is the process,
not the price, that provided the rationale for setting aside the option.
An appropriate standard by which to measure director conduct in
the face of a hostile tender offer must take into account the important
interests that the bidder represents. Therefore, I would propose that the
following standard apply:
A person who, in good faith, makes a bona fide tender offer for all
or a portion of the outstanding securities of a company thereby creates
a protected economic expectation in the acquisition. Upon receiving
the offer, the target board of directors has a fiduciary duty to its share-
holders to review the offer to determine whether its terms represent
128. Dynamics II, 635 F. Supp. at 1178-80.
129. Id. at 1180-82.
130. Dynamics IV, 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
131. Id. at 716.
132. Id.
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fair value for the company's securities. If the target board of directors
determines in good faith and after reasonable investigation that better
terms can be obtained for the company, it may take reasonable meas-
ures to realize those terms from the original bidder or another person.
It shall be per se unreasonable if those measures materially disadvan-
tage the original bidder vis-a-vis any other bidder or have the effect of
precluding the original offer from going forward.
The proposed standard applies whenever a bona fide tender offer is
made for the company's securities. The limitation that the offer be bona
fide is intended to give the target board more flexibility in dealing with a
bidder that does not intend to purchase the shares it has offered to buy.
Obviously, this limitation might be abused by the target directors, who
might label any offer as being not bona fide. If the bona fides of an offer
were at issue, it might be appropriate to place the burden on the board to
prove that the offer was not bona fide.
The standard would not disturb the current law regarding director
evaluation of merger offers or offers for the purchase of the corporation's
assets. A board decision to accept or reject such offers would be subject
to the traditional business judgment rule analysis.1 33 Once a potential
bidder decides to go directly to the shareholders, however, the board's
ability to interfere is limited. While a hostile tender offer, like a negoti-
ated merger or sale of assets, results in a change of control of the target,
that similarity does not mean that role of the target board ought neces-
sarily be the same. 134  As a preliminary matter, corporation statutes
expressly assign a role to the board in mergers and sales of assets, while
they are silent when the transaction is a hostile tender offer. 135 In addi-
tion, offerors forego access to confidential information, the advantages of
a smooth and orderly transfer of control, and some financing options
133. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F.
Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa. 1985). See also Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining The Role of
Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 315 (1987) (arguing for statutory changes that would assign to
independent directors the authority to pass upon merger offers).
Because the standard proposed here applies only after a tender offer has been or is about to be
made, lock-up options and similar devices that a board might use in a negotiated transaction in the
absence of a hostile tender offer would be unobjectionable. Hastings-Murtagh v. Texas Air Corp.,
649 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
134. Some writers have argued that the "equivalence" between a negotiated sale or merger, on
the one hand, and a tender offer, on the other, is such that the board's role should be the same in
each. See, eg., Steinbrink, Management's Response to The Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs. L.
REV. 882 (1978); Herzel, Schmidt &'Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender
Offers, 61 Cm. B. REC. 152 (1979). A counter argument, set forth in detail in Structural Approach,
supra note 7, at 848-52, is summarized in the text.
135. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 11.01, 11.03, 12.01, & 12.02 (1984); Struc-
tural Approach, supra note 7, at 850-51.
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when they do not or cannot negotiate directly with target manage-
ment.'36 Finally, the hostile tender offer serves as a check on manage-
ment that is intent on entrenching itself in office.' 37
The standard provides some protection for target directors who
decide to oppose an offer on the basis of inadequate price. The directors'
decision on that matter would be entitled to the protections of the busi-
ness judgment rule. Unlike the current law, however, the proposed stan-
dard dramatically limits the acceptable response. By expressly
recognizing that the bidder has an economic expectation, it incorporates
state tort law concepts and case law relating to interference with prospec-
tive economic advantage.138 In general, that tort has the following ele-
ments: (1) intentional interference by the defendant, (2) with an
economic expectancy of the plaintiff, (3) of which the defendant knew or
should have known, (4) resulting in the expectancy being lost, and (5) the
plaintiff being damaged.1 39 In appropriate circumstances, the interfer-
ence might be the basis for injunctive relief."
Under this standard, one is privileged to interfere with another's
prospective economic advantage in the course of competition, provided
that competition meets a standard of fairness. 41  Directors, as fiducia-
ries, are privileged to interfere with offers made to their beneficiaries (the
shareholders) if the directors determine that the offer is not in the best
interests of the shareholders. 42 If the directors of a target corporation
have a fiduciary duty to the shareholders in relation to tender offers, they
136. A share-for-share exchange, for instance, is far easier to accomplish in a negotiated trans-
action than in a tender offer setting.
137. Structural Approach, supra note 7, at 850.
138. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS § 131 ('. Keeton 5th ed.
1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 762-774A (1965); State Law, supra note 28. Under
this tort, one may interfere with another's prospective economic advantage in the course of competi-
tion, provided that competition meets a standard of fairness. Frandsen v. Jensen-Sundquist Agency,
Inc., 802 F.2d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[Wi]hile competition is not a defense to a charge of interfer-
ing with an existing contract..., it is a defense to a charge of interfering with prospective contrac-
tual relations, provided it is fair competition."). If the directors of a target corporation have a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders in relation to tender offers, they would be privileged to interfere
with offers that they believed were not in the best interests of the shareholders. State Law, supra
note 28, at 506-14. What is argued here is that the fiduciary duties of the target board should be
altered so that, under no circumstances, does the board have a duty to preclude the shareholders
from accepting a tender offer that the board disfavors. With that duty removed, the privilege of the
board to interfere with a tender offer is similarly limited. It can encourage an auction, but it cannot
preclude the offer from going forward without violating its privilege.
139. State Law, supra note 28, at 499.
140. Jewelcor, Inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F. Supp. 221, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
141. Frandsen, 802 F.2d at 948.
142. See id. at 506-14.
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would be privileged to interfere with offers that they believed were not in
the best interests of the shareholders. The argument here is that the fidu-
ciary duties of the target board should be altered so that under no cir-
cumstances will the board have a duty to preclude the shareholders from
accepting a tender offer that the board disfavors. With that duty
removed, the privilege of the board to interfere with a tender offer is
similarly limited. It can encourage an auction, but it cannot preclude the
offer from going forward without violating its privilege.
Thus, many of the defensive maneuvers now so prevalent in contests
for corporate control would be tortious vis-A-vis the hostile bidder under
the standard suggested here. Poison pills that render a bid uneconomi-
cal,'4 3 lock-up options' 44 and corporate restructurings145 that alter the
nature of the target, transfer of stock to an employee stock ownership
plan,146 self-tenders that coerce the shareholders into tendering, 147 and
sales of a target's key assets1 48 would fail to pass muster under the stan-
dard. Other tactics, such as a noncoercive self-tender or offering to pay
certain reasonable and limited expenses to induce a bidder to enter the
fray, should be allowed, so long as the effect is not to bar the first bidder
from the competition.' 49
V. CONCLUSION
Early cases judging the legality of defensive maneuvers to tender
offers tended to favor target management. The reasons for this are
unclear, but may relate to the courts' distrust of the tender offer tactic.
In any event, the jurisprudence that has developed has relied primarily
143. E.g., City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (requiring
redemption of poison pill); In re Damon Corp. Stockholders Litigation, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,040 (Del. Ch. 1988) (upholding poison pill on the basis of traditional
business judgment rule analysis); Dynamics 1, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
144. E.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); Mills
Acquisition Co. V. Macmillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,072
(Del. 1988), rev'g, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,071 (Del. Ch. 1988).
145. E.g., City Capital Assocs., 551 A.2d 787 (1988); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552
A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988); British Printing v. Harcourt Brace, 664 F.2d 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); AC
Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
146. E.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Frantz Mfg. Co. v.
EAC Indus., Inc., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985).
147. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 811 F.2d 414
(8th Cir. 1987); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
148. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246 (C.D. Cal. 1984);
Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. I11. 1982); G.M. Sub. Corp. v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 415 A.2d 473 (Del. 1980),
149. E.g., Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 93,660 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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on the business judgment rule, a rule that often serves to protect the
directors' actions. As tender offers have become more prevalent, how-
ever, the courts seem to be less trustful of target management. At the
same time, scholarly writing appearing in the past few years argues per-
suasively that the hostile tender offer plays an important role in main-
taining a market for corporate control, a market worth protecting.
The business judgment rule cases, however, do not provide the
courts with doctrine to set aside defensive maneuvers that unduly inter-
fere with this market or appear unfair in regard to the interests of a good
faith bidder for corporate control. As a result, the Delaware courts have
modified the business judgment rule as it applies in tender offer cases,
and other courts have manipulated or largely ignored the doctrine. Close
examination of the doctrine that has developed in these cases reveals that
it has lost any persuasive powers it once had. In its place, I have pro-
posed a rule that recognizes the interests of the bidder, yet retains a role
for target management. This change, if accompanied by a change in the
Williams Act lengthening the minimum time that a tender offer must
remain open, should enhance shareholder returns, while protecting the
legitimate expectations of the bidder.
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